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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a situation in which you are buying a used car and
agree to a certain price because the dealer assures you the car's
engine has been replaced. Imagine that the engine in the car
purchased is, in fact, old and damaged, and that the dealer was
aware of this condition the entire time, but chose to mislead you to
increase the price. Ignoring redhibition and the possible rescission
of the sale, can you recover from the used car dealer because the
price you paid was artificially inflated? After all, you could likely
find a mechanic to provide his expert opinion on how inflated the
price was due to the misrepresentation. Or must you first resell the
car at a lower price that reflects its market value and, thereby, have
objective evidence of the actual loss suffered? Such a requirement
makes sense considering experts may disagree and the resale may
serve as the only true, indisputable reflection of the car's value.
The hypothetical presented, while not exactly analogous,' is
similar to an issue with which courts have recently grappled in
addressing securities fraud actions. It is an issue courts have
described as "loss causation," a primary element of a securities
fraud action that concerns the nexus between a corporation's
malfeasance and the complaining shareholder's resulting loss.
2
Until recently, the answer was unclear as to exactly what a plaintiff
must allege and prove to recover. One United States court of
appeals held that a plaintiff need only establish that a corporation's
Copyright 2006, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Obviously, the face-to-face transaction involving the sale of the car
differs in numerous respects from a public securities market. A security
arguably has no worth outside of the market considering the security's value can
only be realized through its sale. On the other hand, a car is a consumable and
will be of some value to its owner, regardless of whether or not it is sold. The
car engine hypothetical is included in this note to provide a practical, day-to-day
illustration of the differing ways in which a loss incurred by overpayment may
be evidenced. These same possibilities for demonstrating a loss are also
relevant in securities fraud actions.
2. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).
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misrepresentation artificially inflated the price of the stock at the
time of purchase, 3 while other circuits required the plaintiff to do
more by pointing to a resulting loss and establishing a direct causal
connection between it and the defendant's misrepresentation.4
While these courts have referred to this difference as one of loss
causation, the real disagreement lies over the very existence of the
loss: some courts believed the loss occurs upon purchase, while the
others believed loss is not inevitable; thus, something more must
be shown to evidence it.
The confusion surrounding what these courts have described as
loss causation, but would be better termed "loss existence," was
put to rest in April of 2005 when the United States Supreme Court
handed down its unanimous opinion in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Broudo. In Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the standard of loss causation followed by the
minority of circuits by specifically holding that "an inflated
purchase price will not itself constitute or proximately cause the
relevant economic loss. ' '6 Instead, the Court adopted the
heightened standard and held loss causation requires "that a
plaintiff prove that the defendant's misrepresentation (or other
fraudulent conduct) proximately caused the plaintiffs economic
loss.",
7
In reaching its decision, the Court concluded that a purchaser
of stock at an artificially inflated price, meaning a price that has
been elevated on account of a fraudulent misrepresentation by the
issuing corporation, has not suffered a loss at that time. A loss is
only suffered if the corporation or someone else discloses the
misrepresentation, which then causes the value of the stock to
decline. This standard is significant because it essentially
3. See Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd,
544 U.S. 336 (2005).
4. See Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343
F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165 (3d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1149 (2001); Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116
F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1997); Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th
Cir.), cert denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990).
5. 544 U.S. 336.
6. Id. at 342.
7. Id. at 346.
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precludes plaintiffs from proving that a loss existed in the absence
of a market reaction, even if financial experts could testify to the
loss at the time of purchase. Obviously, this theory of loss
existence centered on market reliance presents a great challenge to
plaintiffs because they must now point to a misrepresentation, a
disclosure, and a subsequent depreciation in value of the stock tied
to the misrepresentation. While imposing such a high burden on
plaintiffs will curb frivolous suits and rightfully protect corporate
defendants from being subject to unreasonable liability, it is likely
to present a number of problems that the Court failed to
acknowledge in its opinion.
This note aims to highlight the difficult issues faced by the
Court and the practical effects likely to result from the decision,
including those that may prove problematic. Part II begins by
offering a brief explanation of the Rule 1Ob-5 action and its
elements, focusing on transaction and loss causation, and then
shifts to a discussion of the conflict within the circuits concerning
the loss causation standard. Moreover, the section reiterates that
the real issue at bar is not one of loss causation but rather loss
existence, and notes that this issue has been afforded greater
attention in scholarly circles than in courts. Part III centers on
Dura Pharmaceuticals, presenting the facts of the case, the
outcome, and the Court's reasoning. Part IV provides an analysis
of the opinion, detailing the persuasive aspects as well as those that
are not particularly compelling. It then introduces three practical
effects likely to result, including some that may not have been
anticipated by the Court. Part V provides three reasons why the
Court might have settled on a standard of market corroboration as
evidence of loss and imposed such a demanding burden on
plaintiffs. Finally, Part VI concludes by acknowledging that the
Court was faced with a very difficult case and ultimately reached a
sound conclusion. However, the section comments that the Court
was not as persuasive as it could have been considering it framed
the issue as one of loss causation rather than loss existence and
supported its decision by way of statutory interpretation rather than
practical considerations.
2006] 259
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II. THE RULE 101B-5 ACTION, ITS ELEMENTS, AND THE CONFUSION
SURROUNDING Loss CAUSATION
This section begins with an overview of the Rule 1 Ob-5 cause
of action and the remedy it affords shareholders. It then introduces
the requisite elements of the 1Ob-5 action, focusing upon loss
causation, the element at issue in this note. Finally, this section
addresses the conflict within the United States courts of appeals in
approaching the showing of loss causation, as well as the conflict
among legal scholars over how this element should be evidenced.
A. The Rule 10b-5 Action
The corporate scandals of recent years have highlighted the
importance of the securities fraud action. This action is typically
brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 ("1934 Act")8 and its accompanying regulatory Rule lOb-5,9
promulgated in 1942. However, neither the 1934 Act nor Rule
lOb-5 provides for an express cause of action. Nevertheless, the
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). The general antifraud provision of the 1934
Act is found in Section 10(b) and reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) To use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1942). The language of Rule lOb-5,
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
260 [Vol. 67
NOTES
Rule lOb-5 securities fraud action was held to be an implied
private right of action in the 1946 case of Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co.'0 And, while it is unlikely that today's Supreme
Court would recognize the holding in Kardon, earlier Supreme
Court cases did," and, consequently, the Rule 1Ob-5 action now
stands as a viable cause of action. The judicially-created action
has even survived Congressional review, as Congress has failed to
rescind or impede the cause of action over the years, including in
its recent legislative reform of securities law.
12
The Rule lOb-5 securities fraud action is significant because it
serves as a vehicle by which shareholders can ensure that corporate
directors do not perpetrate fraud in securities transactions, thus
safeguarding their interests as well as those of the public at large.
In fact, the Rule 1Ob-5 action is recognized as the "principal means
used by private investors to recover for fraudulent misconduct in
private actions."' 13  Specifically, these actions target fraudulent
misrepresentations corporate management may make "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security," 14 whether
these misrepresentations or omissions concern expected earnings,
anticipated product releases, or other material news. In doing so,
the Rule 1Ob-5 action provides shareholders with an avenue to
recover whatever losses they may suffer should the corporation's
stock value decline on account of the misrepresentation.
B. Elements of the Rule 10b-5 Action
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Court laid out the six basic
elements required of a Rule 1Ob-5 plaintiff: (1) he must point to a
material misrepresentation on the part of the defendant; (2) he must
show the defendant acted with scienter; (3) he must show the
10. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
11. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975).
12. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"),
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
13. David S. Escoffery, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule
10b-5 in Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA"), 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1781, 1785 (2000).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
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transaction in question involved the purchase or sale of a security;
(4) he must show "transaction causation;" (5) he must show he
suffered an economic loss; and (6) he must show "loss
causation."
15
When evaluating the causation elements of Rule 1Ob-5 actions,
courts and scholars alike have focused upon two distinct kinds of
causation: transaction and loss.' 6 Because a cause of action under
Rule lOb-5 is not expressly provided, 17 one will not find these two
elements specifically enumerated or defined in any statute.
However, the precise terminology was introduced by the Second
Circuit in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,18 and is now
widely accepted. 19
To establish transaction causation, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant's fraud affected the plaintiffs engagement in the
transaction. Typically, plaintiffs meet this element by
demonstrating that they would not have entered into the transaction
at issue, i.e., purchased or sold the security, if not for the
misrepresentation or omission on the part of the defendant.
21
However, a "but for" showing is not a prerequisite to establishing
transaction causation. The more appropriate tort analogy is
"reliance," meaning the plaintiff must demonstrate that he relied on
the misrepresentation in choosing to act as he did.22
Loss causation involves an additional showing on the part of
the plaintiff, specifically, one in which the plaintiff establishes a
15. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
16. See, e.g., Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir.
1997); Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions,
60 Bus. LAW. 507, 508-09 (2005).
17. Larry D. Soderquist, Fraud and Related Issues Under Rule 10b-5 and
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 1490 PLI/CoRP. 515, 518 (2005) (citing Kardon v.
Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (the case first establishing a
cause of action under the 1934 Act)).
18. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
19. Escoffery, supra note 13, at 1794.
20. Id. at 1790.
21. Devin F. Ryan, Yet Another Bough on the "Judicial Oak": The Second
Circuit Clarifies Inquiry Notice and its Loss Causation Requirement Under the
PSLRA in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 79 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 485, 508-09
(2005).
22. Id.
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causal link between the misrepresentation at issue and the
economic loss suffered.23 Some have equated this additional
requirement to the delictual concept of "proximate causation,"
arguing that the plaintiff ultimately must establish that the
defendant's conduct was legally responsible for the loss at issue.
24
The following example better illustrates the distinction
between transaction and loss causation. Suppose a seller of a home
misrepresents its condition by failing to tell the prospective buyer
that it is infested with termites. Suppose the buyer goes ahead and
purchases the home. Then, suppose a tornado hits the town and
destroys the home. In such a situation, the buyer, if he chose to
sue the seller on account of the misrepresentation, would be able to
prove transaction causation because he would not have engaged in
the transaction if the seller had not lied about the termites.
However, the purchaser would not succeed in proving loss
causation because the loss he has suffered, namely, the destruction
of the home, was caused by a tornado, not the fraudulent
misrepresentation regarding the termites. With or without the
termites, the loss suffered from the tornado would have been the
same. The imposition of the loss causation requirement on top of
transaction causation prevents the seller from becoming an insurer
with respect to all risks associated with an investment based on his
lying about a single one.
C. Conflict within the United States Courts of Appeals
In accordance with the twin requirements set forth in Schlick,
courts have consistently held that both transaction and loss
causation must be shown with Rule 1 Ob-5 actions,25 but there has
been confusion and conflict over the interpretation of loss
causation. In short, courts have disagreed over exactly what the
plaintiff must allege and ultimately prove to satisfy the loss
causation element.26  While some courts contend it is akin to
proximate causation, others maintain it only requires a plaintiff to
23. Fox, supra note 16, at 511.
24. Ryan, supra note 21, at 509.
25. Fox, supra note 16, at 515.
26. Jonathan C. Dickey, Current Trends in Federal Securities Litigation,
SL020 A.L.I-A.B.A. 891, 896 (2005).
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show "some causal nexus" between the misrepresentation and the
loss suffered.27 The difficulty in ascertaining the precise nature of
loss causation has led some courts to refer to the requirement as
"ungainly, exotic, confusing, and even unhappy." 28
While this inability to pin down the element of loss causation
has received a great deal of attention from various courts, the issue
confronted in Dura Pharmaceuticals differs in that it relates to the
very existence of a loss, rather than causation itself, and, hence, it
has not received as much attention. Specifically, the issue is
whether a loss occurs upon the purchase of a security at an
artificially inflated price or whether it occurs when the market
realizes the misrepresentation and the security's price decreases.
The Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals referred to the case
as one of loss causation, but that is somewhat misleading since the
issue differs from loss causation. The Court, in classifying the
issue as loss causation, suggested it was one many circuits have
addressed. However, the following subsections reveal that the
precise issue of loss existence has not been addressed by many
courts but, instead, has received greater attention in scholarly
circles.
1. Circuits Requiring Market Corroboration as Evidence of a
Loss
After framing the problem as one of loss causation, the
Supreme Court referred to a circuit split and pointed out that the
Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits endorsed the
position it ultimately adopted. 29 The common thread between the
27. Escoffery, supra note 13, at 1790. See also In re Control Data Corp.
Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1991).
28. Escoffery, supra note 13, at 1794.
29. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 340 (2005). The following
cases were cited by the Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo
as evidence of this position: Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath
Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223
F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000); Robbins v. KogerProps., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441 (1 th Cir.
1997); and Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990). Some of
these cases are easily distinguishable from Dura Pharmaceuticals and will not
be discussed in this section. Instead, this section will focus on the circuits that
have addressed the tough issues that most resemble the one faced by the
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circuits is that each required plaintiffs to do more than merely
allege that a corporation's fraudulent misrepresentation artificially
inflated the stock price at the time of purchase; instead, they
required plaintiffs to prove that the misrepresentation caused an
actual loss.30  The apparent concern of these courts was the
possibility of a windfall recovery by plaintiffs. 31 These particular
circuits feared that a plaintiff would recover from a corporation
when factors other than the misrepresentation were ultimately
responsible for the loss suffered. Therefore, they have essentially
required plaintiffs in securities fraud actions to show that an actual
economic loss was proximately caused by the misrepresentation at
issue.32 Only by imposing this burden of proof on plaintiffs can
courts adequately protect corporations from being liable for what
one author terms "phantom losses."
33
In framing the issue as one of loss causation, the Court
overlooked a subtle distinction presented in Dura
Pharmaceuticals. The main question presented by the case is:
"When does the loss occur?" Specifically, the Court sought to
determine whether the loss occurs upon purchase or whether it
occurs following market corroboration. On the other hand, the
element of loss causation presupposes that a loss has already been
suffered by the plaintiff and, instead, focuses on the nexus between
the loss and the misrepresentation. Obviously, the two concepts
are related since the existence of a loss is encompassed within the
loss causation analysis. However, the distinction between the two
related issues is important and should be noted. The Court
Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, that being the issue of loss existence
rather than the broader issue of loss causation. See also Ryan, supra note 21, at
513.
30. Ryan, supra note 21, at 513.
31. See, e.g., Bastian, 892 F.2d at 684-85.
32. See, e.g., Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 185.
33. Professor Coffee describes a phantom loss as "one simply too
speculative and indefinite in the absence of any evidence that the market
considered the stock to have been overvalued because of the alleged patent
problem." John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme
Court Should Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 Bus. LAW. 533,
538 (2005). Coffee argues for reliance on market corroboration rather than
expert testimony, and that is the position the Court adopts. Id. at 534.
2006]
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compounded its oversight when it grouped the Second, Third,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits together and suggested that they
maintain the same position on loss causation. In doing so, the
Court failed to note the subtle differences between the cases
addressed by each circuit. This subsection addresses only the
relevant issue of loss existence and ignores the cases involving loss
causation.
34
The Third Circuit in Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.35 was not
faced with a situation directly analogous to that in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, but it did, perhaps unintentionally, address the
issue of loss existence when it held that the plaintiffs in question
set forth a viable cause of action. Like the Supreme Court in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, the Third Circuit categorized the issue at hand as
one of loss causation. 36 In Semerenko, the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant corporation had made various misrepresentations
about itself, including its financial condition, its willingness to
complete a tender offer, and its willingness to complete a proposed
merger, all of which contributed to an artificially inflated stock
price.37  The plaintiffs further alleged that they suffered a loss
when the stock price dropped immediately after the
misrepresentations were disclosed. 3 8 This additional allegation of
a market drop following the disclosure distinguishes Semerenko
from Dura Pharmaceuticals since the plaintiffs failed to make
such an allegation in Dura Pharmaceuticals. The Third Circuit, in
holding that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged loss causation,
34. See supra note 29 (referencing the circuit cases cited by the Supreme
Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals and also pointing out the fact that the majority
of those cases addressed the causal nexus between a presupposed loss and the
corporate misrepresentation, rather than the issue of loss existence which is at
the forefront of Dura Pharmaceuticals). In addition, it should be pointed out
that this note's consideration of cases relating to loss existence and loss
causation is limited to the cases and circuits mentioned by the Supreme Court.
There are likely other federal cases relevant to these issues. However, such
cases are beyond the scope of this note since its focus is on Dura
Pharmaceuticals and the Supreme Court's analysis and reasoning in that
specific case.
35. 223 F.3d 165.
36. Id. at 169.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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relied upon the corrective disclosure and the market's reaction as
evidence that the misrepresentations proximately caused the
decline in the security's value. 39  This focus on market
corroboration meant loss existence was at issue because it was only
when the market reacted to the misrepresentation that the Third
Circuit concluded a loss was actually suffered. This analysis is
distinct from that typically involved with loss causation, which
focuses upon establishing a nexus between a presupposed loss and
the misrepresentation. Again, it is important to acknowledge that
Semerenko is distinct from Dura Pharmaceuticals because the
Third Circuit was not addressing the precise issue of whether the
purchase alone of an artificially inflated stock constituted a loss.
However, the fact that the Third Circuit relied upon a market
reaction in concluding that plaintiffs suffered a loss is relevant to
the issue of loss existence confronted in Dura Pharmaceuticals.
The distinction between loss existence and loss causation is
better illustrated by lookinp at the Eleventh Circuit case of Robbins
v. Koger Properties, Inc. In Robbins, investors filed a lOb-5
claim against the defendant corporation and its accounting firm
alleging that misrepresented financial statements led the investors
to purchase stock shares at artificially inflated prices.4 1 While the
trial court found the allegations sufficient to support the cause of
action, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that there was no
demonstration that the defendants' actions actually caused the
decline in the value of the plaintiffs' investment.42 In Robbins,
there was a misrepresentation and a loss suffered, but the plaintiffs
failed to effectively tie them together. In essence, they failed to
negate the possibility that something else might have contributed
to the loss suffered. The Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Robbins
centered on the nexus between the loss incurred and the
misrepresentation perpetrated, rather than on determining whether
a loss was suffered at all. This analysis is distinct from that in
Semerenko, which focused on ascertaining if and when a loss
occurred.
39. Id. at 183-87.
40. 116 F.3d 1441 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1448-49.
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2. Circuits Contending a Loss Occurs Upon Purchase
In contrast to the Third Circuit's holding in Semerenko which
required market corroboration, the Ninth Circuit held that a loss
was established if the plaintiffs merely showed that the
corporation's fraudulent misrepresentation artificially inflated the
stock price on the date of purchase.43 The Ninth Circuit in Broudo
v. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,44 the opinion on which the
Supreme Court ultimately granted writs,45 objected to the
requirement of market corroboration. Instead, it reasoned that the
injury to the stockholder occurs at the time of purchase; thus, the
plaintiffs need not point to a precipitous decline in the stock's
value following the revelation of the corporate wrongdoing.46
While the Ninth Circuit did not discuss how the loss would be
calculated, the loss would likely be determined by the court and
jury based on their evaluation of expert testimony valuing the
amount of inflation. 47 In short, all the Ninth Circuit required to
evidence a loss was a showing that the price of the security was
overstated at the time of purchase, and that the overstatement was
caused by a corporate misrepresentation.
D. Competing Scholarly Views on Loss Existence
While the Supreme Court implied that a great many courts
have addressed the issue in Dura Pharmaceuticals, the relevant
jurisprudence was fairly limited as only the Third and Ninth
Circuits took up the precise issue of loss existence. Between these
two circuits, the split boiled down to a fundamental disagreement
over whether the loss occurred at the time of purchase, or whether
market corroboration was required to establish the loss. In light of
the conflict among the circuits, legal scholars eagerly awaited a
Supreme Court opinion that would pin down the incurrence of a
43. It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit, like the Third Circuit and the
Supreme Court, also classified the issue as one of loss causation, although it is
distinct and better termed loss existence.
44. 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
45. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 542 U.S. 936 (2004).
46. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938.
47. Coffee, supra note 33, at 534.
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loss, which, in turn, would help clarify the element of loss
causation.
In fact, a number of scholars, divided on the optimal outcome
to be reached by the Court, prepared notes and comments, some of
which called for the adoption of the heightened standard requiring
market corroboration, 48 and some that argued that the Ninth Circuit
got it right.49 Those that favored the adoption of the heightened
standard claimed that market corroboration better ensures that an
actual loss was suffered and caused by the defendant before a
plaintiff is allowed to recover.50 In this sense, it guards against
"causation by presumption," which arguably could arise if the
plaintiffs only had to show they purchased a security at an
artificially inflated price. 51  Without a market corroboration
standard, some scholars feared a presumption of loss might enable
a plaintiff to recover when he did not suffer a loss, or when he
suffered a loss that was not caused by the misrepresentation.
Moreover, these advocates maintained that the stock market is
better suited than a court to determine the extent of a loss, should
one be suffered.52  Allowing juries to weigh conflicting expert
testimony offered to evidence or refute a loss, rather than relying
on the market, might lead to speculative awards. 53  Finally,
advocates of the market corroboration standard thought it would
help limit recovery under Rule lOb-5 actions and, consequently,
minimize the expensive and inefficient transaction costs that
accompany Rule 1Ob-5 awards.
54
On the other hand, those scholars who felt that a loss occurred
upon purchase at an artificially inflated price expressed concern
with a standard reliant on market corroboration. These advocates
noted that a market's reaction is not always self-evident, which
could make it difficult to establish that a particular reaction is
related to the disclosure of the corporate misrepresentation.
55
48. See generally Coffee, supra note 33.
49. Fox, supra note 16, at 530-32.
50. Coffee, supra note 33, at 534.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 535.
53. Id. at 539.
54. Id. at 534.
55. Fox, supra note 16, at 523.
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Moreover, adopting a standard that requires a security's value to
decrease might prevent some deserving plaintiffs from recovering,
considering it is possible that a loss caused by a misrepresentation
could be offset by some other market force, leaving the price the
same.
56
In short, there was sophisticated debate between scholars
concerning the precise issue of loss existence and how it must be
shown leading up to Dura Pharmaceuticals. These scholars
eagerly awaited the opinion and, on April 19, 2005, it was handed
down.
III. DURA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. BROUDO
A. Facts of the Case
The plaintiffs in Dura Pharmaceuticals were individuals who
bought stock in the company between April 15, 1997, and
February 24, 1998. In their securities fraud action against the
corporation and some of its corporate officers, the plaintiffs alleged
that Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Dura") made misrepresentations
about the company's profits as well as future Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") approval of its new asthmatic device. 59
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Dura falsely claimed it
expected the FDA to soon approve its new asthmatic spray
product.58 In November of 1998, Dura revealed that the FDA
would not approve its device.59 This announcement was followed
by a temporary dip in Dura's share value, but one that was erased
within a week. While the plaintiffs alleged that the
misrepresentation made by Dura concerning the spray device
artificially inflated the stock price, their complaint did not point to
any market corroboration as evidence of a loss suffered.
56. Id. at 524.
57. The portion of the litigation involving Dura's false profits report was
resolved prior to this case. Therefore, the Court's analysis, as well as this
note's, is limited to the controversy surrounding the misrepresentation of the
FDA's expected approval of the spray device. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336, 339-40 (2005).
58. Id. at 339.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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B. The Supreme Court's Holding and Reasoning
The Ninth Circuit originally held that the plaintiffs asserted a
viable cause of action, but the Supreme Court unanimously
reversed, holding that the complaint failed to adequately allege loss
causation with respect to the misrepresentation concerning the
spray device. 6' Again, it is important to note that the Supreme
Court classified the issue as one of loss causation when it could be
better termed loss existence. In dismissing the claim for failure to
demonstrate loss causation, the Court explicitly rejected the stance
taken by the Ninth Circuit by insisting that an investor may not
establish a loss merely by alleging that the price of the security was
artificially inflated at the time of purchase.
The Court essentially concluded that the plaintiffs had not
suffered a loss at the time of purchase because an artificially
inflated price does not invariably lead to a future loss. It noted that
an investor may sell his stock before the misrepresentation is
disclosed, meaning before the information related to the
misrepresentation becomes public, or the stock price might not
decline following such a disclosure.63 In both of these instances,
the Court explained that no loss would be suffered by the investor;
therefore, to allow recovery would unjustly enrich the plaintiffs.
The Court went on to mention that, even if there is a decline in the
share value, other factors may be responsible for the loss, in which
case it would be unfair to hold the corporation liable.64 In short,
61. Id. at 338.
62. Justice Breyer's opinion in Dura Pharmaceuticals is actually divided
into two parts. This note is concerned with only Part A, the section addressing
the substantive issue of loss causation or, more precisely, loss existence. Part B,
on the other hand, deals with the procedural issue of exactly what a plaintiff in a
Rule 1Ob-5 action must allege. In Part B, Justice Breyer emphasized that a
plaintiff must allege in his complaint the requisite elements of economic loss
and causation, the very elements the Court clarified in Part A. Justice Breyer
noted that a failure to allege the relevant loss suffered in the complaint does not
adequately provide the defendant with notice of the claims he will face.
63. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 342-43.
64. A perfect example of this scenario can be seen in Bastian v. Petren Res.
Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990), one of the
cases cited by the Supreme Court to illustrate the circuit split concerning loss
causation. In Bastian, the plaintiffs were fraudulently induced to invest in an oil
and gas limited partnership, which soon thereafter became worthless. Id. at 682.
However, the plaintiffs were denied recovery because they failed to allege that
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the Court wanted to avoid what some have called a "causation by
presumption" in which a loss would be presumed merely because
the stock price was artificially inflated at the time of purchase.
65
The Court accomplished this objective by suggesting that plaintiffs
must point to a decline in the market value of the stock as evidence
of their loss, and then tie this market reaction to the
misrepresentation.
66
Besides citing instances when an inflated purchase price does
not lead to an inevitable loss, the Court cited three authorities in
support of its position. First, it referred to the "common-law
roots" 67 of the securities fraud action as evidence that loss
causation cannot be proven solely by an artificially inflated
purchase price. It noted that with the tort of misrepresentation, a
party who misrepresents the financial condition of the corporation
when selling stock does not become liable to the purchaser until
the facts become known, thereby causing the share value to
depreciate. 68 Second, the Court suggested to hold otherwise, i.e.,
to allow recovery under the circumstances, may undermine an
important objective of securities law: to maintain public
confidence in the market.6 9 The Court acknowledged that private
securities actions may deter fraud and, thereby, provide the public
with confidence, but it emphasized that this protection only covers
those economic losses actually caused by corporate
misrepresentations. Third, and lastly, the Court relied on the
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA"), 70 which codified the requirement of loss causation in
the misrepresentation caused the loss. Id. at 686. This result was likely a fair
one considering that oil prices steadily declined following the plaintiffs'
investment and the loss was most likely attributable to this downturn. While the
focus in Bastian is the broader issue of loss causation rather than the precise
issue of loss existence, it is helpful in demonstrating how other factors, besides a
corporate misrepresentation, may contribute to a loss.
65. Coffee, supra note 33, at 534.
66. The impact of establishing a standard reliant upon a market reaction will
be discussed in-depth in Part IV.B.
67. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 344.
68. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A cmt. b (1965)).
69. Id. at 345.
70. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
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securities fraud actions.7' While the statute does not explicitly
state how loss causation must be shown, the Court concluded it
evidenced Congressional agreement with the position the Court
assumes in its holding.
72
IV. ANALYSIS OF DURA PHARMACEUTICALS, INCLUDING THE
PRACTICAL EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
The most compelling justification offered by the Court in
support of its decision to reverse the Ninth Circuit opinion is that
the purchase of a security at an artificially inflated price does not
always lead to a loss. The Court aptly pointed out the various
ways in which plaintiffs may avoid incurring a loss,73 and the
Court's adoption of a standard of market corroboration ensures that
an actual loss will be suffered before a plaintiff can recover.
Another persuasive aspect of the Court's opinion is its reliance on
the common law history of the tort of misrepresentation.74
Considering that the tort is recognized by some as the predecessor
to the securities fraud action,75 as well as the fact that the tort calls
for some form of market corroboration, 76 this particular
justification is sound.
Unfortunately, not all aspects of the Court's reasoning are as
compelling. For one, the Court's contention that its holding
supported an important objective of securities law is not
particularly persuasive. The Court argued that public confidence
might be undermined if corporations were held liable when losses
71. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000) (codifying the PSLRA's
requirement of loss causation). It reads:
Loss causation. In any private action arising under this chapter [15
USCS §§ 78a et seq.], the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that
the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this chapter [15
USCS §§ 78a et seq.] caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to
recover damages.
Id.
72. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 346.
73. Id. at 342-43.
74. Id. at 344.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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were not incurred,77 which is a fair point. However, it failed to
acknowledge that some people might want higher standards of
corporate accountability that call for imposing liability whenever a
company misrepresents itself. Consistent with this thought, these
people might view a ruling allowing Dura to avoid liability after
lying to its shareholders as contrary to the tenets of securities law.
In short, the Court's discussion of the objectives of securities law
and how its holding comports with those objectives is somewhat
conclusory and one-sided.
A second facet of the Court's reasoning which is unconvincing
is its reliance on the PSLRA. The Court argued that the PSLRA's
codification of the requirement of loss causation evidenced
Congressional agreement with its holding.78  However, this
argument is unpersuasive. First of all, the precise issue in Dura
Pharmaceuticals is loss existence, which means Congressional
reiteration of loss causation is not exactly on point. Moreover, the
PSLRA's codification of loss causation does not speak to how the
showing must be made, which is the point of contention dividing
the circuits that have actually addressed the issue of loss causation.
Whether the issue in Dura Pharmaceuticals is classified as loss
existence or loss causation, the PSLRA does not explicitly resolve
whether a plaintiff's assertion that he purchased stock at an
artificially inflated price is a viable cause of action. Considering
this unanswered question, the Supreme Court's argument that the
PSLRA provides statutory authority for its holding is not
persuasive.
The precise issue faced by the Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals
was a narrow one that had not been addressed by many courts.
Considering this lack of existing authority, it appears the Court
may have been forced to rely upon some sources that are not
particularly supportive of its conclusion. The Court's reasoning
would have been more convincing if it had been more explicit
about the policy considerations that supported its conclusion.
Therefore, this note will explore some of the considerations that
would have strengthened the resolution reached. However, the
77. Id.
78. Id. at 345.
274 [Vol. 67
NOTES
following subsections first explore the practical effects and
implications of the decision on future litigants.
A. Corporate Defendants 'Liability Will Be Limited
The most obvious practical effect of the Dura Pharmaceuticals
opinion is that it establishes a limit on corporate defendants' civil
liability in Rule 1Ob-5 actions. By requiring plaintiffs to do more
than merely point to an artificially inflated purchase price by
demonstrating that a market reaction occurred, the Court helps
corporations avoid liability for losses that do not occur. Also, by
requiring plaintiffs to establish a nexus between the market
reaction and the misrepresentation, the Court ensures that
corporations will not be found liable for losses for which they are
not responsible. The now-clarified loss causation (or loss
existence) standard means that plaintiffs will have to provide
evidence that an actual loss was suffered and that it resulted from
the corporate misrepresentation, not from general, unrelated
market forces. This imposition of what some have described as a
"Herculean requirement"79 for loss causation will favor corporate
defendants in a number of ways, most notably by reducing the
damages claimed by plaintiffs, the risk posed by securities actions,
and the settlement value of such actions. 80
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision clarifying the
requisite standard of proof is sound and reflects a valid concern for
extending corporate civil liability too far. Allowing plaintiffs to
recover without demonstrating that a loss was suffered or that the
corporation in question was responsible for a loss suffered would
subject corporations to tremendous liability, which could threaten
the entire securities exchange system. This concern for corporate
civil liability was relied on in another seminal Supreme Court
decision involving securities fraud actions: Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores.
8 1
79. Ryan, supra note 21, at 500-01.
80. Jonathan C. Dickey, Robert F. Serio & Wayne W. Smith, Supreme
Court Reverses Ninth Circuit's Loss Causation Standard, 19 No. 5 INSIGHTS 20,
21(2005).
81. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court was faced with the question
of whether mere offerees of a stock offering, i.e., persons who
neither bought nor sold securities during the class period in
question, could recover in a Rule lOb-5 action. 2 This odd
circumstance arose when Blue Chip Stamp Co. ("Blue Chip"), by
virtue of a consent decree it entered into with the United States,
was required to re-organize its company and, in doing so, offered a
number of shares of stock to retailers who had previously used the
stamp service, but were not shareholders in the former company.
8 3
The plaintiffs, who fit into this category of retailers, consulted a
prospectus provided by Blue Chip to assist in their decision to
purchase securities, and ultimately decided not to invest.
84
However, they alleged that the prospectus provided was
"materially misleading in its overly pessimistic appraisal of Blue
Chip's status and future prospects." 5 They further alleged that
this misrepresentation, which was done so that rejected shares
could later be offered to the public at a higher price, ultimately
caused them to incur a loss because they missed out on a fruitful
economic venture. 6 In dismissing the plaintiffs' claims, the
Supreme Court held that only actual "purchasers or sellers" of
securities have standing to bring a private damages action under
Rule lOb-5, thus adopting the Birnbaum rule set forth by the
Second Circuit. -7
In reaching its decision in Blue Chip to adopt the "purchaser or
seller" requirement, the Court relied heavily on practical
considerations and discussed at length the tremendous risk of
abuse presented by Rule lOb-5 actions.8 8  The Court noted that
Rule 1Ob-5 litigation "presents a danger of vexatiousness different
in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in
82. Id. at 725.
83. Id. at 725-26.
84. Id. at 727.
85. Id. at 726.
86. Id. at 727.
87. Id. at 731. The Birnbaum rule refers to the case, Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), in which
the Second Circuit first established that only purchasers or sellers of securities
were entitled to bring securities fraud actions.
88. 421 U.S. at 739-43.
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general,, 8 9 and then provided a laundry-list of reasons why it
would be unfair to corporations to hold otherwise. Most notably,
the Court remarked that adopting a lenient standing requirement
would increase the number of nuisance or "strike" suits which have
great settlement value, despite having little chance of success at
trial. 90 Moreover, should a corporation be reluctant to settle, it
would be forced to engage in trial preparation that would be
extremely time consuming, expensive, and disruptive to its normal
business activity.91  In short, the Court noted that adopting a
relaxed standing requirement would make it very difficult for
corporations to dispose of cases prior to trial, thereby subjecting
corporations to a tremendous amount of civil liability.
92
The Blue Chip opinion has been referred to as "an essay on the
evils of a Rule 1 Ob-5 allowed to go too far,",93 because it discussed
in great detail the dangers of extending corporate civil liability too
far. While the Court did not give voice to this rationale in reaching
its decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, the opinion clearly has the
same effect of limiting corporate liability.
B. Plaintiffs Will Have to Point to a Market Reaction Following
Corrective Disclosure
The Court's refusal to acknowledge that the plaintiffs suffered
a loss when they overpaid for their securities suggests a market
reaction to a corrective disclosure is necessary to establish the
existence of a loss. This standard of market corroboration
effectively precludes plaintiffs from providing expert testimony to
evidence the loss suffered upon purchase. Moreover, the standard
adopted requires plaintiffs to establish a causal nexus between the
depreciation of the stock value and the disclosure of the corporate
misrepresentation. In other words, the implication from Dura
Pharmaceuticals is that a recoverable loss is suffered only when
the share price drops immediately following the corrective
disclosure.
89. Id. at 739.
90. Id. at 740.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 742-43.
93. Soderquist, supra note 17, at 530.
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Evidence of this implication was made apparent when the
Court noted the relationship between timing and causation. For
example, the Court observed that if a purchaser sells after the truth
is disclosed, an initially inflated purchase price only "might mean a
later loss." 94 It is up to the plaintiff to show that the market loss
was caused by the misrepresentation, instead of changed economic
or investor expectations, or other market factors unrelated to the
misrepresentation. The Court then made the point that the longer
the time between the purchase and sale of a security, the more
likely it is that other factors, besides the misrepresentation, caused
the loss.95 Considering the Court's emphasis on timing and its
effect on diluting a causal inference, one may infer that the Court
would not afford much weight to a price drop as evidence of a loss
if it does not immediately follow the corrective disclosure.
By relying on market reactions, the Court adopts a stringent
standard of loss causation (or loss existence). Not only does it
require plaintiffs to establish a loss by pointing to the market, but
the Court also requires plaintiffs to tie this loss to the
misrepresentation.
1. Why the Court Relies on Market Reaction
This reliance on the market likely stems from the Court's
preference for objective evidence. Rather than having to choose
between conflicting expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs and
the defendants, the market's response provides a neutral and,
supposedly, indisputable indicator of causation and loss. While the
Court did not explicitly make note of its preference for objectivity,
it did so in Blue Chip when it adopted the "purchaser or seller"
requirement. The Court, in adopting the Birnbaum rule in Blue
Chip, emphasized the fact that the class of plaintiffs under the rule
would be an "objectively demonstrable fact,",96 a condition the
Court found very desirable. Without such a standing requirement,
the Court pointed out that plaintiffs' testimony could be
completely uncorroborated, yet still sufficient to get to trial. 97 By
94. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).
95. Id. at 343.
96. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 747.
97. Id. at 746.
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adopting the "purchaser or seller" requirement, the Court ensures
that the class of plaintiffs will be "verifiable by documentation;'
98
thus, the Court will be dealing with demonstrable recovery, rather
than that which is conjectural or speculative. 99
2. Effects of the Court's Reliance on Market Reaction
While consistent with Blue Chip's emphasis on objectivity, the
Court's reliance on the market as proof of a loss is problematic
because a market correction is not always self-evident. In other
words, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain what exactly is causing
the market to react. The Court itself acknowledged this difficulty
when it mentioned the many possibilities that may contribute to the
drop in a security's value as well as the difficulty in pinpointing
these causes, including "changed economic circumstances,
changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-
specific facts," and so forth. l00 This problem of determining
whether a market is responding to a particular event means it may
be difficult, if not impossible sometimes, for plaintiffs to
effectively establish a loss.
Besides the difficulty in determining whether the market is
responding to the misrepresentation or one of the other causes
mentioned above, i.e., the difficulty in determining "if' market
realization occurs, it can also be difficult to determine "when"
market realization occurs.' 0 Given the multiple ways in which
disclosure of a misrepresentation can take place, whether it is
through a single public announcement by the corporation,
nonpublic rumors, or investors becoming aware of insider trading,
market realization may also happen in different ways, some of
which may not operate in the open, and some of which may take
longer than others. 10 2 Therefore, it is not always clear whether the
market has responded at all or whether it has only partially
responded to the true situation. 10 3  Obviously, this difference
98. Id. at 742.
99. Id. at 734-35.
100. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 343.
101. Fox, supra note 16, at 523.
102. Id. at 522-23.
103. Id. at 523.
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between a complete and partial reaction goes a long way towards
determining the value of the loss suffered and the amount
recovered.
The difficulty in determining "if' or "when" the market reacts
to the misrepresentation reveals the problems inherent in the
Court's reliance on the market as evidence of a loss suffered. For a
market reaction to accurately reflect a loss and entitle a plaintiff to
recover that amount, complete realization must occur at the time of
the disclosure, meaning the share price must drop immediately and
reflect the entire amount of the inflation, and the drop must not be
offset by "good news unrelated to the misstatement."' 4 For
example, if positive news counterbalances the drop in price
precipitated by the market's realization of the misrepresentation,
the plaintiff will not be able to recover because he has not suffered
a net value "loss," although he would have profited if the
corporation had not misled him. 10 5 In this break-even situation, the
plaintiff has clearly suffered a loss because he has been deprived of
a profit he would have had absent a corporate misrepresentation.
However, the holding in Dura Pharmaceuticals precludes him
from recovering. In other words, the standard adopted by the
Court prevents a plaintiff from recovering in the absence of a
market reaction, even though the misrepresentation may have
negatively influenced the share value.
While the Court is wise to oblige plaintiffs to establish that an
actual loss was suffered and to tie that loss to the corporation,
requiring them to do so by pointing to a market reaction in
response to a corrective disclosure presents certain problems.
Given the difficulty in pinpointing exactly what is affecting the
market and whether the market has responded completely, some
deserving plaintiffs who have suffered a loss will be unable to
recover. Had the Court come to a different conclusion in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, plaintiffs would have been able to establish that
a loss was incurred by way of expert testimony. These concerns
over a standard of market corroboration were expressed by
commentators in anticipation of the Dura Pharmaceuticals
opinion, and discussed in a prior section of this note. Despite these
104. Id. at 524.
105. Id. at 530.
280 [Vol. 67
NOTES
worries, the Court apparently concluded that other advantageous
aspects of its ruling would outweigh these potential problems.
C. Corporations Will Be Encouraged to Delay Public Disclosure
of the Misrepresentation Until the Market has Already Responded
The Court, in establishing a standard of loss causation in which
plaintiffs have to point to a market reaction following a corrective
disclosure, essentially provides corporate defendants with a
perverse strategy by which they can. avoid liability for fraudulent
misrepresentations. The standard implicitly adopted by the Court
holds corporate defendants liable for the amount of the drop in the
value of the security that immediately follows the disclosure of the
corporate misrepresentation. Corporate defendants are not held
accountable for any price drop that precedes the corrective
disclosure. For instance, Dura told investors that the FDA was
about to approve one of its products. This announcement
undoubtedly increased the value of the shares considering a new
product would likely generate increased profits. However, when
the FDA approval never materialized and disappointing earnings
reports were released, the value of the stock most certainly
declined. In this sense, the market already reflected the bad news
prior to the disclosure, since Dura had not yet made an
announcement nor had the information otherwise become public.
Under the standard adopted, Dura is not liable because the market
reaction did not follow the corrective disclosure.
Therefore, the effect of Dura Pharmaceuticals is that it is now
in the best interests of corporations to do whatever is possible to
ensure that their misrepresentation is reflected by the market
before public disclosure occurs. These efforts could include
delaying the disclosure as long as possible after the
misrepresentation in hopes there will not be a market reaction to
the disclosure, or, if there is one, that other market forces will
obscure the connection. As one author notes, "it is very possible
for a misstatement to inflate [the] price but for the public
announcement of the true situation not to be accompanied by a
discrete drop in price because the market [has] already realized...
2006]
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the true situation."' 06 Even if there is a reaction to the disclosure,
the probability of a corporation being found liable decreases the
longer the misrepresentation is delayed. The Court itself made a
point of emphasizing how the passage of time dilutes a causal
inference, 107 a point on which this note commented earlier. In
addition to delay tactics, corporations would be wise to issue
unrelated statements aimed at negatively influencing share value in
hopes of avoiding liability for a misrepresentation. Such a tactic
would further complicate the causation picture, making it even
more difficult for plaintiffs to effectively tie their loss to the
original misrepresentation.
V. REASONS WHY THE COURT IMPOSED SUCH A HEAVY BURDEN
ON PLAINTIFFS
As alluded to in the preceding sections, the Supreme Court's
opinion in Dura Pharmaceuticals is unusual when compared with
other seminal Rule 1Ob-5 cases, most notably Blue Chip and Basic
Inc. v. Levinson.10 8  In these two opinions, the Court was very
106. Id. at 524.
107. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005).
108. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Basic is regarded as a seminal securities fraud
case because the Supreme Court officially accepted the "fraud-on-the-market"
theory-a theory that relates to a plaintiff's burden of establishing transaction
causation. As mentioned before, transaction causation requires a plaintiff to
show that the defendant's misrepresentation affected his engagement in the
transaction that led to his loss. In this case, the issue was whether the individual
class members must each make a showing of reliance. In adopting the "fraud-
on-the-market" theory, the Supreme Court relieved plaintiffs of the obligation of
showing that each relied on the misrepresentation at issue. Id. at 224. Instead, a
rebuttable presumption that the plaintiffs relied on the integrity of the price set
by the market is established if the plaintiffs can point to a corporate
misrepresentation. Id. at 225. The rationale behind this rebuttable presumption
involves financial analysis and is succinctly summarized below:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an
open and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is
determined by the available material information regarding the
company and its business . . . Misleading statements will therefore
defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely
on the misstatements . . . The causal connection between the
defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case is
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forthright in acknowledging its uncertainty in ascertaining
Congressional intent with respect to Rule 1Ob-5 actions.
1°9
Consequently, the Court was very candid in revealing the
considerations affecting its decision and the weight it afforded
them. On the other hand, the Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals did
not give voice to the many potential considerations. Aside from its
astute practical observation that the purchase of a security at an
artificially inflated price does not lead to an inevitable loss, the
Court concealed other practical and philosophical justifications and
proceeded instead with an opinion which is based, predominantly,
on a questionable legal rationale.
A. Danger of Extending Corporate Civil Liability
It seems likely that the overriding reason behind the Court's
decision is its concern with extending corporate civil liability too
far. After all, Part V of this note points out that the most apparent
effect of the decision is to limit the liability of corporate
defendants. While the Court did not explicitly acknowledge this
motivating factor as it did in Blue Chip, its impact on the holding is
indisputable.
B. Uneasiness with the Remedy Provided by Rule 1Ob-5 Actions
Another reason the Court refused to allow a lenient standard of
loss causation might be its uneasiness with the remedy provided
no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on
misrepresentations.
Id. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
109. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737
(1975) ("[W]e would by no means be understood as suggesting that we are able
to divine from the language of [Section] 10(b) the express 'intent of Congress'
as to the contours of a private cause of action under Rule 1 Ob-5. When we deal
with private actions under Rule lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn. Such growth may be quite
consistent with the congressional enactment and with the role of the federal
judiciary in interpreting it... but it would be disingenuous to suggest that either
Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942
foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule lOb-5.").
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for Rule lOb-5 actions. This concern was expressed by
commentators in anticipation of the opinion, and the Court appears
to have shared such concern. In Rule lOb-5 actions, the plaintiffs
are defrauded shareholders and the defendant is the corporation.
Considering a corporation's financial resources come from its
shareholders, a Rule 1Ob-5 action pits one class of corporate
shareholders against another. A finding of liability on the part of
the corporation means that the shareholders who were not
defrauded must pay those who were, even though the payor
shareholders did not make the misrepresentation. 1 ° Considering
the shareholders are held liable rather than the corporate officers
who actually did the misleading, the remedy has been criticized
because it does not provide a direct deterrent effect."'
The remedy has also been questioned because it merely calls
for wealth-transfers from the non-defrauded class to the defrauded
class. 1 2 Accompanying these transfers are numerous transaction
costs, including, among others, expensive legal fees. 113  This
concern with inefficient transaction costs and the lack of a
deterrent effect might well have influenced the Court and its
decision to limit corporate susceptibility to the Rule 1 Ob-5 action.
C. Uneasiness with Reliance on Expert Testimony
The Court's adoption of a standard of loss causation reliant on
market corroboration amounts to an implicit rejection of expert
testimony as evidence of loss. After all, the Court could have
affirmed the Ninth Circuit holding which allowed plaintiffs to put
on expert testimony that they suffered a loss at the time they
purchased the security. However, the Court chose not to, instead
opting for a standard by which loss is demonstrated by the market.
This choice likely reflects uneasiness with expert testimony
because it is more conjectural and speculative than market reliance.
This advantage of objectivity provided by a market corroboration
110. Coffee, supra note 33, at 534.
111. Id. at 542-43.
112. Id. at 534.
113. Id.
284 [Vol. 67
standard was advanced by commentators 1 4 and appears to have
resonated with the Court.
The Court's preference for objective evidence was made clear
in Blue Chip when it adopted the "purchaser or seller"
requirement, but the Court's concern with relying on financial
experts was not new. In Basic, the dissent expressed concern over
the majority's embrace ofan expert's economic theory." 5 While
Justice White, who wrote the dissent in Basic, acknowledged the
allure of basing legal decisions on purported "mathematical
exactitude and scientific certainty," he noted that an expert's
economic theories are, in the end, only theories that will not
necessarily prove to be accurate."16  White also predicted that
"[c]onfusion and contradiction in court rulings" would ensue
because of the Court's blending of legal analysis and economic
theory.117 Combining the concern voiced in the Basic dissent with
the fact that courts are often confronted with contradictory expert
testimony presented by plaintiffs and defendants, the Supreme
Court's reliance on market corroboration may reveal uneasiness
with expert economic theory.
Despite the Court's attempt to circumvent reliance on expert
testimony, the standard established in Dura Pharmaceuticals may
not achieve this result. As noted in Part V(B), adopting a standard
in which plaintiffs must show that the disclosure of the
misrepresentation caused the value of the stock to decline presents
a problem because other market forces may be affecting the share
value. Given this high burden of proof, plaintiffs may have to call
upon expert testimony to explain exactly what is causing the
market to react. Moreover, defendants may also use experts to try
and disprove the causal nexus between the misrepresentation
perpetrated and the resulting market reaction. Therefore, the so-
called "advantage of objectivity" of the market corroboration
standard may not be as objective as initially hoped considering
114. Id. at 534, 538-39.
115. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252-54 (1988) (White, J.,
dissenting).
116. Id.at254.
117. Id. at252.
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speculative expert testimony may still be relevant with respect to
causation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Court was faced with the
difficult task of deciding when a loss occurs in situations where
plaintiffs are defrauded into buying stock at artificially inflated
prices. To maintain suits when plaintiffs make only this initial
showing would potentially allow plaintiffs to recover when they
did not suffer a loss or when the corporation was not responsible
for such loss. On the other hand, to adopt a standard requiring
market corroboration of a loss would prohibit all plaintiffs from
recovering in the absence of a market reaction, even though some
may have suffered an actual loss and are able to evidence it with
expert testimony. The Court ultimately decided to favor the latter
option, thereby preventing some deserving plaintiffs from
recovering, but also ensuring that those who are undeserving will
not recover.
The Court's decision, while damaging to plaintiffs, is sound
and reflects valid concerns about limiting the liability of corporate
defendants, the problems with the Rule lOb-5 remedy, and the
drawbacks of relying on conflicting, and oftentimes speculative,
expert testimony. The opinion refines the Rule 1Ob-5 common law
cause of action that originated with Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co. in a way that is protective of corporate investors who typically
bear the brunt of Rule lOb-5 awards, despite being free of any
wrongdoing. This protection comes at the expense of some
deserving plaintiffs who will no longer be able to recover, but it is
a decision that favors the common good.
However, the Court was not as persuasive as it could have been
in explaining and justifying its decision. Its claim that the
PSLRA's codification of loss causation provides statutory
authority for its position is not convincing. After all, the precise
issue in Dura Pharmaceuticals is loss existence rather than the
broader issue of loss causation. Not only did the Court gloss over
this distinction, but it misrepresented the amount of judicial
attention that loss existence has received by grouping the two
circuits that have addressed it along with the others that have
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considered only loss causation. Moreover, the Court did not give
voice to the many practical considerations and implications of the
decision as it did in previous securities fraud cases. For example,
there is no acknowledgment of the perverse incentive created by
the standard of market corroboration, or that the Securities and
Exchange Commission is likely to bear a greater burden in
monitoring corporate activity since Rule lOb-5 actions will be
more difficult to maintain. While the Court's opinion is practical
and defensible, it should have been more straightforward in its
analysis like it was in Blue Chip and Basic, rather than providing a
somewhat cursory and unconvincing statutory justification.
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